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On the Definition and Evaluation of Earnings Usefulness
The approach used by the returns/earnings research pioneers to evaluate the usefulness of earnings to investors was to equate usefulness with actual use: if individuals act as if they use a specific information item, then such information can be considered useful. Ball and Brown [1968, p. 161] state: "An observed revision of stock prices associated with the release of the income report would thus provide evidence that the information reflected in income numbers is useful." This empirical approach rests on the definition of information in "information (communication) theory." A message (e.g., a financial report or a news broadcast) is said to convey information if it causes a change in the receiver's probability distribution of the concerned random variable. Such a change in the probability distribution (beliefs) will trigger an action;3 hence, if an action (reflected by, say, a change in stock price or volume) can be attributed to specific information, such information is considered useful. This is the logic underlying the returns/earnings association studies. 4 If a revision in stock prices provides evidence on earnings usefulness, then obviously larger revisions imply greater usefulness. Accordingly, inferences about earnings usefulness can be derived from estimates of the correlations between stock returns (price revisions) and earnings. Stated differently, if the information contribution of earnings to investors is significant, then earnings should exhibit a considerable explanatory power (both cross-sectionally and over time) with respect to price revisions around the earnings announcements. Conversely, if price revisions are found to be largely unrelated to earnings, the information contribution (usefulness) of earnings to investors cannot be large. This points to a consideration of the returns/earnings correlation, or the R2 of the regression of stock returns on earnings, as a measure of the information contribution of earnings to investors.5 3 Of course, the change in beliefs has to be sufficiently large to compensate for the transaction costs associated with the action.
'The maintained hypothesis of this paradigm is that of capital market efficiency; see Lev and Ohlson [1982] . The stock price change is, of course, a restricted indicator of information usefulness, since in a heterogeneous belief setting, investors might use the information without the price being changed. Volume of trading is a more sensitive indicator of information usefulness. In reality, however, price and volume changes are, in general, highly correlated.
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The emphasis in the first part of this study on the extent of the returns/earnings correlation as a measure of earnings usefulness is further motivated by reference to a major objective of earnings-facilitating the prediction of future investor cash flows or stock returns. The centrality of this objective is embedded in the following statements from the FASB's "Conceptual Framework": "The principal role of financial reporting [is] to furnish the investor and lender with information useful to assess the prospective risk and returns associated with an investment" (FASB [1976, There is no pretense here that the returns/earnings R2 is a complete measure of the usefulness of earnings. Earnings were found to be useful in various capital market contexts that are not examined here, such as in the prediction of stocks' systematic risk, corporate bankruptcy, and bond ratings (see Foster [1986] ).7 Furthermore, earnings are used in various contexts beyond capital markets, such as for contracting purposes within the firm (e.g., for managerial compensation), and between the firm and its creditors and suppliers. Even within the capital market context considered here, a complete evaluation of earnings usefulness requires consideration of the costs of producing and disseminating earnings, as well as their social usefulness in risk sharing and in enriching markets (i.e., enhancing the completeness of markets); see Ohlson [1979] .
persistence (see section 5). The correlation coefficient, R2, is not generally of major concern in hypothesis testing. However, when information contribution of the premier financial statement item-earnings-is at issue, the degree to which observed price revisions can be ascribed to (or explained by) earnings obviously provides evidence on earnings usefulness (or, rather, the extent to which earnings are actually used by investors). Moreover, since earnings are postulated by economic theory to be a major determinant of asset values (e.g., Miller and Rock [1985] and Ohlson [1988b]), not just one of many potentially valuerelevant variables, the R2 of the returns/earnings regression cannot be ignored.
Theil [1971, pp. 662-63] establishes the correspondence between information theory measures (based on the entropy concept) which reflect information contribution and the regression correlation coefficient, R2. 6 Campbell and Shiller's [1988] study is a recent example where the predictive ability of earnings and dividends with respect to stock prices is evaluated in terms of R2. A more rigorous formulation of the relationship between earnings usefulness and R2 is provided in Appendixes A and B.
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However, information costs and social usefulness issues are not examined here because of their intractability in an empirical setting. Even though the returns/earnings R2 is not a complete measure of the usefulness of earnings, it captures (indirectly, through investors' valuations) a very important attribute of earnings-their ability to facilitate the prediction of future securities returns. This attribute is obviously of primary concern to an important group of financial information users-investors in capital markets.
In the context of the returns/earnings research, the specific information item most commonly examined is reported earnings (unadjusted by the researcher), and the variable with which earnings are associated is the common stock's rate of return. Thus, two measures of change are typically correlated: the change in the stock price (return) around the earnings announcement and the change in the firm's equity (earnings).8 Given that stock prices reflect expectations about future earnings before such earnings are announced, it seems reasonable to correlate the change in price (return) with unexpected earnings (new information) rather than with reported earnings. This can be expected to increase the power of the returns/earnings analysis. The emphasis on unexpected earnings led to the use of proxies for expected earnings, such as time-series or analysts' forecasts. Recently, there is a growing interest in the persistent (permanent) component of the earnings innovation. This line of research essentially attempts to allow for the regression (response) coefficient to vary across firms. As to the stock return variable, residual (or market-adjusted) returns were substituted for raw returns, given that the earnings information is firm-specific.9 These are then the fundamental variables and constructs involved in the returns/earnings research. Table 1 summarizes various relevant characteristics and findings of a sample of returns/earnings studies, based on a survey of the three major accounting research journals for the period 1980-88.1o An evaluation of research findings focusing on the informational contribution of earnings follows. 8 There are, of course, alternative characterizations to the returns/earnings relationship, such as price/earnings (i.e., regressing prices on earnings). Despite the high R2s of the levels' (price on earnings) regressions, the returns/earnings relationship is by far the most widely used characterization, probably because of nonstationarities in levels' (i.e., price) characterizations. Indeed, Easton and Zmijewski [1989] show that predictions of stock prices based on the returns/unexpected earnings constructs were far more accurate than price predictions based on "levels" regressions (e.g., price regressed on earnings).
The Accumulated Evidence
9 Strictly speaking, this is not accurate, as earnings might be correlated with the market index; see Beaver [1981] and, for empirical evidence, Penman [1988] .
" The journals are The Accounting Review (AR), Journal of Accounting Research (JAR), and Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE). The set of studies reported in table 1 is not meant to be exhaustive; rather it contains studies with different characteristics and methodologies aimed at representing a broad spectrum of the returns/earnings research.
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THE RETURN WINDOW
The issue of the window (time interval) over which returns are cumulated is an important one. A regression of returns cumulated over a narrow window around announcements of earnings might understate the usefulness of earnings, if the narrow window fails to capture earningsinduced price revisions beyond the windows (e.g., a delayed investor reaction after announcement-postannouncement drifts). Regressions using wide windows, on the other hand, might overstate the incremental information contribution of earnings, as price changes within the window probably reflect investors' reaction to a myriad of other timely, nonearnings information (e.g., industry-wide events or stock splits and repurchases), which are correlated with earnings.1" Accordingly, varying the window length in returns/earnings studies allows one to focus on the important distinction between the unique informational contribution of earnings over other sources of information (the timeliness of the earnings information) and the extent to which earnings are just correlated with other, perhaps more timely, value-relevant information items. Usefulness of an information item in its strictest sense is clearly indicated by its incremental contribution over other information items.
Will the returns/earnings correlation be perfect if the window is properly measured? Not necessarily. The model presented in Appendix A shows that a regression of stock price revisions on unexpected earnings should result in R2 = 1 only when (a) the earnings information is solely responsible for the price change: namely, the window is properly specified and investors do not adjust reported earnings (e.g., for accounting changes) prior to their use in valuation; (b) expected earnings are properly measured; and (c) investors react identically (constant cross-sectional response coefficient) to the earnings releases of all firms. When these conditions are not met, the returns/earnings association will obviously be less than perfect. The following discussion of empirical findings will relate to these conditions. The first condition deals with the return window and will be discussed presently.
Return windows of practically all possible sizes were used in the returns/earnings research. It seems reasonable that a very narrow window will assure that the price change around announcement is mostly due to the earnings information. Accordingly, I first consider studies with narrow (less than a week) windows. Hagerman et al. (study no. 1 in table 1) report an R2 of 5% for a window of five days around the announcement of quarterly earnings. The R2s were virtually unaffected by changing the "' Earnings are obviously correlated with many other value-relevant, timely information items and firm activities. For example, stock repurchases, which are on the average associated with stock price increases around the announcement date, are generally conducted by firms enjoying unexpected increases in earnings (e.g., Bartov [1989] ). Indeed, signaling models argue that financial devices, such as dividend and capital structure changes and stock splits and stock dividends, are used by managers to convey preearnings (more timely) information; see Lakonishok and Lev [1987] . One of the critical varibles in the returns/earnings studies is the proxy for the market's expected earnings. Since this expectation is unobserved, errors in estimating expected earnings might lead to a misrepresentation of the true returns/earnings association. Expanding the return window provides an opportunity to examine the sensitivity of the returns/earnings regression results to errors in estimating expected earnings. The reason is that as the earnings announcement date approaches, there is usually an intensive flow of earnings-related information to the market (e.g., via preannouncement firms' communications/warnings to analysts, actual earnings announcements of competitor firms, etc.). Investors' expectations, therefore, change quickly and significantly as the announcement date approaches. Accordingly, returns cumulated over a narrow window (e.g., commencing two days before the announcement) could impound earnings expectations which differ considerably from those used by the researcher, such as the Value Line forecasts which are, on the average, a month and a half old at the earnings announcement date. In contrast, when the return cumulation commences a year, say, before the announcement of earnings, using an expectation which is a month and a half old will not matter as much, since the flow of information about next year's earnings is not very intensive at that early date. Accordingly, wide-window regressions-annual returns on annual unexpected earnings-will not be as seriously affected by errors in measuring expected earnings as the narrow window regressions.16 The low R2s from wide-window studies thus suggest that the fault does not lie primarily with errors in measuring expected earnings.
To summarize, the low explanatory power of earnings with respect to cross-sectional variation in returns appears robust to the length of the return window. Very narrow windows (two to five days) yield R2 of 2-5%, while medium (a quarter) to very long (two years) windows result in R2s ranging from 4-7%. R2s of up to 10% are occasionally reported for 164 BARUCH LEV specific subsamples (e.g., firms grouped by size) or by a search for an "optimal window."17 An important point should be noted here. Most returns/earnings studies regress returns on unexpected earnings, thereby focusing on the incremental information contribution (surprise) of earnings over expectations at the time of announcement. When earnings usefulness is at issue, it might be argued that unexpected earnings understate the usefulness of earnings, since expected earnings are also useful to investors. Stated differently, as the earnings announcement date approaches, investors revise their expectations about earnings (using, for example, firms' preearnings release communications) and such revisions affect stock prices. Accordingly, unexpected earnings, at the time of announcement, might convey only a small part of the total information in earnings. Restricting the analysis to price revisions over narrow windows around earnings announcement dates might, therefore, underestimate the usefulness of earnings to investors. However, as noted above, the extent of the returns/earnings association does not increase considerably when the return window is expanded to one year (and even to two years in Collins and Kothari's [1989] study), or when annual earnings changes are used as right-hand variables. Returns over wide windows regressed on the (deflated) levels of earnings (e.g., study no. 9a in table 1) obviously capture the impact of the entire information set about earnings that is released throughout the year, and not just that in unexpected earnings. The wide windows' returns/earnings evidence, therefore, provides an upper limit to the informational contribution of earnings.18 As was indicated above, this upper limit (in terms of R2s) is not significantly different from the earnings information contribution indicated by narrow-window studies based on unexpected earnings.
The studies analyzed so far were cross-sectional. The underlying assumption of a constant response coefficient in cross-sectional studies (i.e., investors react identically to earnings of all firms) is obviously unrealistic. This assumption might be more tenable for time-series returns/earnings regressions, since investor reaction to earnings of the same firm over time might be more stable than across different firms. To provide an indication of the time-series returns/earnings association, I regressed quarterly residual returns on the percentage change in quar-17 For the sake of completeness, I should mention studies which consider lengthening the earnings rather than the returns window. Thus, for example, Jacobson [1987] regressed residual returns on unexpected ROI (earnings to total assets) of the current and the succeeding year. The R2 increased from 7% to 11% by the inclusion of future earnings in the regression. It is doubtful, however, whether such inclusion of yet undisclosed earnings in the regression enhances our appreciation of the usefulness of earnings to investors. A similar lengthening of the earnings window was recently examined by Freeman and Tse [1989] in an attempt to capture postannouncement (confirmation) news. 18 Upper limit, because some of the wide windows' returns/earnings association probably reflects the information contribution of more timely nonearnings sources (e.g., R&D announcements) that are correlated with earnings; see n. 11. Financial ratios were also used in other studies. For example, Freeman (no. 8 in table 1) reports R2s of 7-10% from regressing returns on changes in the ratio of earnings to total assets (where the firm's ratio was adjusted for the industry change). But Freeman's R2s might be higher than previously mentioned due to the incorporation in the regression equation of additional independent variables proxying for current costs. Jacobson (no. 9) reports R2s of 2-7% from regressing stock returns on the ratio of earnings to total assets (ROI). An interesting finding of this study is that regressing raw returns on ROI yielded the lowest R2 (2%). This is counterintuitive since earnings are believed to provide information on 19 Firms with negative earnings were deleted because of problems in measuring percentage change from negative numbers. Firms with extreme earnings changes (larger than l 300% 1) were also excluded from the sample.
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20These findings are consistent with the time-series results of Oppong [1980] , who confirms Beaver's [1968] cross-sectional findings that, on the average, the variability of firms' residual returns in the earnings announcement week is larger than in other weeks. However, Oppong finds that this result is driven by a few extreme price reactions. In fact, the majority of Oppong's firms did not exhibit an above-average price variability during the earnings announcement week. This result, that the average returns/earnings R2 is driven by a specific characteristic of some firms, appears to be of more general validity and will be mentioned again later (e.g., n. 30). systematic factors (the market return) as well as on residual returns.21 To summarize, the 5-7% returns/earnings R2s for financial ratios do not differ markedly from those reported in the previous section. It can, therefore, be concluded that the ratio forms do not significantly improve the explanatory power of earnings.
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INCORPORATING EARNINGS-RELATED ITEMS
Several studies examined the informational contribution of earningsrelated items. When narrow return windows were used (e.g., studies nos. Thus, R2s of up to 15% characterize regressions of returns on earnings and earnings-related items run over wide windows. The explanatory power of earnings components over wide return windows is not surprising, since such earnings-related items probably proxy for more timely information. For example, given the positive market reaction to firms' announcements of capital expenditures and R&D outlays (e.g., Woolridge [1988] ), an association between annual stock returns and cash flow components reflecting such outlays is almost tautological. Also, current values of earnings (e.g., replacement cost) reflect industry-and economywide information (e.g., input price changes) that are also reflected in stock returns.22 Nevertheless, R2s of up to 15%, and for specific years up to 30% (see studies no. 14 and 15 in table 1), associated with earningsrelated variables highlight the modest informational contribution of the "bottom line" as a summary measure or a "sufficient statistic." Information dissemination costs could be reduced if earnings were a comprehensive summary measure that reflects the information contained in a broad set of other financial variables. Currently reported earnings do not appear to be a successful "sufficient statistics" (see also Ou and Penman [1989] for the incremental information content of nonearnings data). The 15-30% R2s from regressing returns on fundamental variables also dispel frequently heard arguments that the variability of residual returns is mostly "white noise" (or the result of "noise trading") that cannot be explained by systematic, fundamental factors.
Intertemporal Stability of the Returns/Earnings Relation
The returns/earnings studies examined so far generally reported regression coefficients and R2s averaged over time or for samples pooled over time. If earnings are to be useful in predicting future returns (recall the discussion in section 2), the form of the returns/earnings relationship should exhibit a certain degree of stability over time. If such a relationship is intertemporally unstable (namely, the coefficients of the regressions of returns on earnings and possibly additional variables fluctuate significantly from period to period), then even perfect foreknowledge of future earnings will not be of much use in predicting returns. The degree of intertemporal stability of the returns/earnings relationship is, therefore, an important determinant of the usefulness of earnings to investors. However, researchers have devoted scant attention to this issue.
To obtain evidence on the returns/earnings stability, I cross-sectionally regressed residual returns (April through March) on the percentage change in annual earnings of the NYSE firms listed on the CRSP tape (December 31 fiscal year). Regressions were run separately for each of the years 1982-86, and estimated coefficients are reported in table 3. The estimated intercepts range from -.029 to .034; the slope estimates range from -.009 to .031; and the R2 fluctuates between 1% and 4%. The variation in parameter estimates is evidently large and statistically significant. A Chow test for changes in the slope coefficient indicates that out of the four adjacent pairs of coefficients (e.g., 1982 and 1983, 1983 and 1984, etc.), three changes were statistically significant (see table 3 ). The evidence thus indicates considerable instability over time of the returns/earnings relation.
Other studies also provide indirect evidence on wide intertemporal [1978] who regressed E/P ratios on subsequent earnings changes for the years 1956-70. The coefficients of the next year's earnings change ranged from -.003 to -.304, while the coefficients of the earnings change two years after the E/P formation ranged from .098 to -.167. Many of these coefficients were not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The wide intertemporal fluctuations of the parameters of the returns/ earnings regression reflect negatively on the usefulness of earnings in facilitating the prediction of future stock returns-perhaps even more so than the low level of the returns/earnings association. The findings presented above suggest that high-quality return predictions, conditional on earnings, would be difficult to come by, since the returns/earnings relationship appears to be very time-specific.23 Not much is currently known about the underlying reasons for this instability. Theory suggests that one of the reasons might be changes in the discount rate. Indeed, 169 when an explicit interest rate (e.g., in Collins and Kothari [1989] ) or yearly dummy variables (e.g., in Easton and Harris [1989] ) were incorporated into the returns/earnings relationship, the R2s increased. It is not clear, however, whether the regression coefficients become more stable over time with the addition of these variables. Other reasons for instability might include business cycle stages, changes in anticipated inflation, and changes in firms' production-investment decisions. Given the importance of the issue, it should be explicitly addressed in returns/ earnings studies. Most important, the validity of research findings should always be verified on holdout samples from different industries and particularly different time periods.24
The Benefits of Research Refinements
The literature on the returns/earnings relation is characterized by continual attempts at refining the analysis, often exhibiting considerable ingenuity and methodological sophistication. Thus, for example, the seemingly crude Ball-Brown earnings expectation model (last year's earnings) gave way to time-series expectation models and later to analysts' forecasts; residual returns were estimated in various ways (e.g., market-model residuals vs. mean-adjusted returns); a precise identification of the earnings announcement date (e.g., from the Broad Tape) was substituted for the traditional Wall Street Journal source; and "reverse regressions" (see n. 15) were substituted for traditional ones. However, the recent empirical findings summarized in table 1 indicate a surprising robustness of low R2s to such refinements; none appears to indicate an appreciably higher explanatory power of earnings than that of the earlier studies.2"
The current interest in the "persistent" component of earnings is an example of a recent refinement. This development draws on the wellknown distinction between permanent and transitory earnings, which received recent impetus by Miller and Rock [1985] . Earnings persistence is defined as the extent to which an innovation (unexpectedness) in the earnings series causes investors to revise their expectations about future earnings. Thus, unexpected earnings are split into two components: one (persistence) that affects expectations of future earnings and cash flows, and the other (transitory) that does not affect expectations. The persistence component is often estimated from the time series of earnings, and 24 This is analogous to the problems that characterized the early bankruptcy and bond ratings prediction models, which reported prediction tests made on the samples used to estimate the models. The subsequent use of holdout samples to verify predictive ability of the models improved their validity and application. 25 This observation is not meant to imply that the expressed objective of the recent returns/earnings studies was to achieve higher R2s. In many cases the objective was to test specific hypotheses. However, with improved model specification and data one would expect to observe a higher returns/earnings association, if the low association observed earlier was mainly due to modeling or methodological deficiencies. This, however, does not appear to be the case. Yet another refinement of the returns/earnings relationship has recently been suggested by Ohlson [1988b] . One implication of his model is that both the level and the change in earnings affect stock values, and therefore both should be used as independent variables in the returns/ earnings regression. This proposition was empirically corroborated by Easton and Harris [1988] ; earnings levels appear to provide most of the explanatory power with respect to market-adjusted returns. However, as to overall explanatory power, this regression (R2 = 3%) yielded results similar to previous regressions.
Most of the recent returns/earnings refinements take one of two forms. (a) An addition of nonearnings or even nonfinancial statement variables (e.g., risk, discount rate) to the returns/earnings regression. Such refinements are essentially attempts at constructing equity valuation models and are therefore beyond the boundaries of this study which focuses on earnings. (b) Departures from the constant response coefficient assumption implicit in cross-sectional returns/earnings regressions, by partitioning firms according to various attributes such as size, industry, P/E, risk, growth rate, persistence, and liquidity, or using dummy variables for such attributes. Such partitioning might identify factors (e.g., firm size) which affect the returns/earnings relation and circumstances (e.g., firms within homogeneous risk groups) where the informational contribution of earnings is larger than that observed, on the average, over random, heterogeneous samples.28
The hazards of overfitting the data should, however, be kept in mind. Clearly, a concerted effort ("fishing expedition") to identify firm classifications within which the returns/earnings correlation is high is bound to "succeed" some time. To avoid overfitting, this line of research should be subjected to at least two constraints. 
The Informational Contribution of Earnings and Implications for Future Research
The evidence on the returns/earnings relation cumulated over the past 20 years provides a consistent picture. Earnings and earnings-related information (e.g., cash flows) explain 2-5% of the cross-sectional or timeseries variability of stock returns for relatively narrow windows, and up to perhaps 7% for very wide windows. Accordingly, an earnings explanatory power of about 5%, on the average, for large, heterogeneous samples appears representative. The parameters of the returns/earnings relation are subject to considerable instability over time, which has yet to be explained. These findings appear robust to the time periods examined and to the various methodologies used. The returns/earnings area, therefore, provides one of the rare cases in economic research in which extensive empirical findings converge to portray a consistent (but somewhat bleak) picture.
Given the overriding utilitarian orientation of accounting and the results of the voluminous returns/earnings research, it is now appropriate to ask: how useful are earnings to equity investors? Strictly speaking, earnings are of some use since their release is associated with a certain market activity (increased securities trade, revision of analyst forecasts, etc.).30 However, the extent of earnings usefulness appears to be very modest. An information variable that explains only about 5% of stock return variability, and whose relation with returns is unstable, cannot be very useful.31 This conclusion is reinforced by the low quality of stock price predictions based on foreknowledge of earnings (see n. 23 above).32 research findings and their choice of agenda items that do not lend themselves to research are also significant contributors to the current state of affairs. The information items examined in these studies (e.g., stock splits) occur less frequently and regularly than earnings, and, therefore, their R2s may not be directly comparable with the returns/earnings R2s. However, despite their regular release, earnings are widely believed to be a major informational source on the firm's performance, so that a comparison of the information contribution of earnings with that of less frequent releases seems warranted.
The observed low informational contribution of earnings, however, is counterintuitive, given the central role of earnings in the firm's financial information system. Casual observation suggests that large earnings changes, particularly negative ones, do significantly impact prices. Financial analysts express their beliefs about the future performance of firms almost exclusively by means of earnings forecasts, and a large component of managers' compensation is generally determined by changes in earnings-related measures. What could explain the low returns/earnings associations?
Several possibilities come to mind. Earnings might indeed be very useful to investors, yet the methodologies used by researchers fail to substantiate this usefulness. Numerous methodological shortcomings were mentioned in sections 3 through 5 (e.g., the relationship between returns and earnings seems nonlinear; the response coefficient is obviously not constant across firms or over time; estimates of expected earnings used to derive the earnings innovation contain errors, etc.).
Other, yet unknown misspecifications might also exist and contribute to the low observed returns/earnings R2s. Obviously, the full impact of such misspecifications is yet to be determined and may never be fully known. Nevertheless, considering the wide range of methodological variation used and the extent of effort invested in the past 20 years in returns/ earnings research, it is doubtful that the "poor showing" of earnings is primarily due to methodological shortcomings.
Another possible reason for the observed low explanatory power of earnings is investor irrationality (market inefficiency). The association between stock returns and value-relevant information, such as earnings, will obviously be low if investors systematically err in information interpretation, or if they overreact to or ignore relevant information (see, for example, Modigliani and Cohn [1979] and Summers [1986] on investor irrationality)." Recent work on "noise trading," namely, irrational investors' demands unrelated to fundamental stock values, is particularly relevant to this issue (e.g., DeLong et al. [1989]
). Investor irrationality with respect to earnings, however, appears inconsistent with evidence on systematic, seemingly rational investor reaction to a myriad of other crude aggregate information that is used as an integrity check on the enterprise. Earnings reports are of this second kind. The information therein embedded is historical, aggregate, and tells little that is not already known-provided the firm is being operated responsibly. Such aggregate information is a rough check on managerial discretion, malfeasance, and the like-much in the same way as the Board of Directors is mainly window dressing but can be mobilized to 'throw the rascals out' if excesses are extreme." Williamson's prediction that "prices lead earnings in the short run but the two move together in the long run" is borne out by the data. These ideas are somewhat similar to the stewardship notion in Paton and Littleton [1940] .
corporate announcements, such as capital expenditures, dividend and capital structure changes, and corporate restructuring activities (e.g., spin-offs). Thus, investor irrationality or market inefficiency arguments and their impact on the returns/earnings relation still await comprehensive theoretical and empirical substantiation.
A third possible explanation for the weak returns/earnings relation, one that should be of particular interest to accounting researchers, is that the information content of currently reported earnings regarding future outcomes of securities is low. The arbitrariness of many accounting measurement and valuation techniques, the lag in reporting earnings, and the incidence of earnings manipulation by managers adversely affect the information content of earnings. The seriousness of these adverse effects can be examined by comparing the extent of the short-term returns/earnings correlation with that of the long-term, since, on the average, the impact of accounting techniques and earnings manipulation decreases as the period over which earnings are measured increases. For example, expensing a particularly large R&D outlay will have a significant effect on a given quarter's earnings, while over, say, a five-year period whether such R&D is immediately expensed or partially capitalized would not have a significant impact on reported earnings. To examine this proposition, I have cross-sectionally regressed residual returns cumulated over five years (1980-84) on the corresponding five-year percentage change in EPS of a sample of 150 Compustat firms spread over eight industries. The R2 of this regression was 35%, about seven times that of the short-term returns/earnings R2.34 There is thus a significant difference between the extent of the short-term (quarterly or annual) returns/ earnings relation and the long-term one. This suggests that the low quality (information content) of short-term earnings is a significant contributor to the observed weak association between earnings and stock returns, and that this low quality is related to the impact of accounting techniques and occasionally management manipulation.
Research on the quality of earnings and other financial information items and on the ways investors disseminate such information (namely, adjust for quality deficiencies) offers a promising extension of the returns/earnings research paradigm. This is a clear departure from current research which largely takes the earnings number at face value. Except for the most obvious experimentation, like the substitution of cash flows or components of earnings for earnings, no serious attempt is being made to question the quality of the reported earnings numbers prior to correlating them with returns. Indeed, there is a surprising imbalance between the level of effort and sophistication that goes into the statistical methodology of the returns/earnings studies and the cavalier approach toward reported earnings. While various deficiencies in earnings are obviously adjusted for by financial analysts and even in the media,35 most researchers (myself included) accept the reported numbers at face value. This, of course, precludes current research from providing insights on how financial information is used by investors, insights that can lead to possible improvement in the measurement and reporting of earnings. Research on the quality of earnings shifts the focus to an explicit consideration of accounting issues by calling for a systematic examination of the extent to which the specific principles underlying accounting measurements and valuations, as well as managerial manipulations, detract from the usefulness of earnings and other financial variables. Such research has the potential both to further our understanding of the role of financial information in asset valuation and to contribute meaningfully to accounting policymaking. classified firms into high, medium, and low financial reporting quality classes, as judged by financial analyst rankings. Over a two-day window, the earnings response coefficient was significantly greater than zero only for the high-quality group of firms, and the returns/earnings R2 for this group (.08) was twice as large as that of the lowquality group. We lack, however, systematic knowledge of the determinants of such quality rankings, namely, of the de facto financial statement analysis process. 86) on the percentage change in 1986 reported EPS for a sample of some 150 firms that adopted FAS No. 87 in 1986.38 The R2 of this regression was 6% (response coefficient = .091, t-value = 3.1). I ran the same regression again, substituting adjusted EPS (i.e., subtracting the impact of FAS No. 87) for the reported ones. The R2 of this regression was 9% (response coefficient = .082, t-value = 3.3). The 50% increase in R2 suggests that investors do adjust reported earnings for perceived deficiencies (in this case, an earnings increase that has already been reflected in market values), and that such adjustments bias the estimated returns/ unadjusted earnings R2 downward.
Insights into the Financial Information Dissemination Process
The above regressions obviously provide only very preliminary evidence. A thorough understanding of the financial information dissemination process requires a careful economic analysis. To continue with the FAS No. 87 example, previous studies have shown that the pension assets surplus is discounted to some extent by investors (namely, a dollar of surplus is associated, on the average, with less than a dollar of equity market value); e.g., Landsman [1986] . Accordingly, one may test the hypothesis that the extent of investors' adjustment of earnings for the impact of FAS No. 87 was related to the prior market undervaluation of the pension surplus. The larger the prior surplus undervaluation, the higher will be investors' recognition of the earnings impact of FAS No. 87. A confirmation of this hypothesis will provide further evidence on investors' perceptiveness. This example demonstrates an important difference between the line of research suggested here and conventional returns/earnings studies. Whereas conventional research does not generally distinguish among sample firms (treating heterogeneous firms as homogeneous), research into investors' use of financial information has to be predicated on the different economic circumstances of firms and industries. Understanding investors' treatment of the earnings impact of, say, FAS No. 87 will require much more than a simple event study. Explicit consideration should be given to factors such as the pension asset undervaluation of each firm, the discount rate used by each firm to determine the pension liability (alleged to be misused by firms to manipulate the pension liability, given the wide latitude allowed prior to FAS No. 87), and to whether the asset surplus (and the consequent earnings impact) was due to the investment acumen of the pension fund manager, signaling future abnormal fund performance, or just to large firm contributions to the pension fund. This line of research will obviously require a careful economic modeling of the event examined, based on a thorough accounting and institutional knowledge.
In 
FROM CONTEMPORANEOUS CORRELATIONS TO
PREDICTIONS
Current capital market research generally assumes that markets are efficient, and that sufficient inferences about the information content of financial variables can be made from contemporaneous correlations with prices (e.g., Beaver et al. [1980] ).39 This perspective is sufficient for the positive research on the use of financial information proposed in the preceding section. For normative research, however, the efficient markets framework appears now to be too restrictive. Both theoretical (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz [1976] ) and empirical (e.g., Ou and Penman [1989] ) research suggest that capital markets are not efficient in the strict sense of fully reflecting all available information.40 It is highly questionable, therefore, whether sufficient inferences about the quality and potential usefulness of financial information can be derived from contemporaneous correlations with stock returns. Empirical studies should, therefore, extend beyond contemporaneous correlations to include explicit tests of the ability of financial information items to facilitate the prediction of asset outcomes or to form portfolios and test for abnormal returns (e.g., Harris and Ohlson [1988] ). An operational measure of quality, on which alternative definitions of financial variables can be ranked, is needed. This measure could be the ability of the variable to facilitate the prediction of securities' outcomes or to provide for improved portfolio decisions. Such a measure of quality reflects both real-life notions of financial information usefulness as well as the FASB's concept of usefulness and quality (recall the quotations in section 2).
The extension of the research domain to include future securities' outcomes also breaks out from the embarrassing circularity in some of the current research. If one assumes that current prices already impound all the relevant information in earnings (i.e., the assumption of market efficiency), then what normative implications can be gained from correlating earnings with contemporaneous returns? What can investors learn from observing the consequences of their own actions (namely, price revisions)? The proposed research thus calls for a considerable expansion of the securities price domain in capital markets accounting research, to include both current and future prices.
EXPLORING THE DETERMINANTS OF EARNINGS QUALITY
Research on the quality of earnings should be aimed at identifying the determinants of quality. This calls for both theoretical and empirical work intended to specify the impact of GAAP and alternatives to GAAP on firm valuation, that is, identifying the effects of the fundamental accounting valuation and measurement principles on the ability of financial variables to predict assets' returns. Specifically, GAAP attempts to enhance the predictive power of financial variables by requiring that anticipated events potentially affecting a firm's future cash flows (e.g., uncollectible accounts receivable) be reflected in current earnings and asset values. However, GAAP, which is based on various postulates and principles (e.g., conservatism), also biases this predictive power. It should be noted that the research line suggested here is free of "true value" or "economic earnings" notions, popular in the policy-oriented research of the 1960s.43 It also does not seek to establish the "social desirability" (in the welfare economics sense) of GAAP alternatives. Rather it proposes a simple, utilitarian benchmark for assessing the usefulness of such alternatives-facilitating investors' risk and return estimates. The suggested research is also distinguished from the current paradigm by its emphasis on a comprehensive adjustment of financial statements. Previous attempts to examine the valuation impact of accounting alternatives were generally restricted to a single item, such as 183 lease capitalization. The mild and mostly inconclusive results of this research might be due to the insensitivity of the statistical tests to the valuation impact of individual items and to offsetting effects ignored by the researcher. For example, when the inclusion of the discounted value of future lease payments is considered alone, it should increase the firm's debt/equity ratio. In a comprehensive discounting of several balance sheet items, however, this debt/equity increase may be offset by decreases resulting from determining other liabilities (e.g., deferred taxes) at their discounted values. The suggested research, therefore, calls for the development and testing of comprehensive (multi-item) adjustment mechanisms as alternatives to GAAP. Dharan [1989] examined firms that changed accounting methods and found that, on average, the firms that adopted income-increasing accounting changes (e.g., a switch from accelerated to straight-line depreciation) had a prechange decline in EPS of 23%, while the income-decreasing firms had a prechange increase of 12% in EPS. Accounting change appears to be an income-smoothing device.
IDENTIFYING THE REASONS FOR NOISE
It should be noted, however, that what appears to be manipulation could in fact arise from the firm's optimal financing, production, or investment decisions. For example, an extension of the estimated useful life of the firm's assets might be aimed at increasing reported earnings, or it might be a bona fide reflection of economic reality (e.g., resulting from a technological improvement). Research on earnings "management" must, therefore, distinguish between manipulation and economically induced accounting activities. Models can be developed for this purpose to indicate the expected values of earnings, assets, or liabilities (e.g., " Also, it has been recently reported that the SEC is seriously reviewing the performance of the FASB. The Wall Street Journal (August 3, 1988, p. 20) commented on this issue: "The SEC review is bound to be looked at closely by Congress. Rep. Ron Wyden, a member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Oversight and Investigation Panel, which has held a score of hearings on accounting issues in recent years, said ... that his prime concern is that the FASB take an aggressive approach to fraud issues. 'Nobody wants things that add to business cost, but we certainly want them to be activist on financial fraud,' the Oregon Democrat said." McNichols and Wilson's [1988] model for uncollectible accounts receivable) and serve as benchmarks against which the reported numbers will be evaluated. Alternatively, market signals can sometimes be used to distinguish between manipulation and economically induced activities, since preliminary evidence suggests that investors are aware of some earnings manipulation and adjust for it. For example, Kellogg [1984] examined firms that disclosed reductions in previously reported values of assets and found that such reductions in the values of assets were associated with significant predisclosure stock price declines. Investors were evidently aware, on average, of some overstatement in asset values before the disclosure was made by the firm. Similarly, Kinney and McDaniel [1989] examined firms that corrected errors in previously reported quarterly results and found that stock returns between the release of the quarterly reports and their correction were, on the average, negative.
The challenge in this area is to gain insight into the motives and means by which management exercises discretion over financial reporting. Most of the accounting research in this area has been limited to choices within GAAP (e.g., the LIFO switch decision). A systematic examination of managerial choices of non-GAAP procedures is called for. From a normative perspective, this knowledge is relevant to regulators in their efforts to enhance the integrity of capital markets. It will also assist investors and auditors in developing early warning systems to signal manipulation. Knowledge of managers' motives and means of manipulation can also be of use in designing contracts with managers to mitigate manipulation and enhance monitoring.
Concluding Remarks
The returns/earnings research evidence suggests that while earnings appear to be used by investors, the extent of earnings usefulness is rather limited. This is indicated by the weak and intertemporally unstable contemporaneous correlation between stock returns and earnings and by the very modest contribution of earnings to the prediction of stock prices and returns. Various reasons can account for the "poor showing" of earnings, among which are methodological shortcomings of the returns/ earnings research paradigm and investor irrationality ("noise trading").
This study focused on a third explanation to the weak returns/earnings correlation-the low information content (quality) of currently reported earnings and other financial variables. The low information content is probably due to biases induced by accounting measurement and valuation principles and in some cases to manipulation of reported data by managers. Capital market research should, therefore, shift its focus to the examination of the role of accounting measurement rules in asset valuation. Such research involves both positive and normative aspects. Regarding the former, the proposed research is aimed at understanding the use of financial information by investors, that is, a thorough investigation of the financial statement analysis process. Our current understanding of this process does not extend much beyond the familiar list of financial ratios presumably used by investors. The normative aspect of the proposed research is aimed at filling a current void in financial economic modeling. Economic models posit a relation between generic financial variables (e.g., "income" 
where the coefficient a serves as a scale factor and E is independent of CF. Accordingly, the postearnings release value of the firm, V1, equals: 
V1 = E(CF I el
APPENDIX B The Relation Between the Quality of Earnings and the Returns/Earnings Correlation
The quality of earnings is defined here in terms of perceived deficiencies in reported earnings (e'l) which detract from their ability to predict investors' cash flows (CF). Such perceived deficiences can be represented by decomposing the error term E in (2) into two errors: E2, reflecting perceived deficiencies in reported earnings which are adjusted for in the process of financial analysis, and E which is the remaining error, reflecting investors' inability to predict perfectly future asset outcomes from earnings. Reported earnings are thus defined as: 
